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Introduction to the Symposium:
Self and Other: Cognitive Perspectives on Trust,
Empathy and the Self
Claire A. Hill
“Self and Other: Cognitive Perspectives on Trust,
Empathy and the Self” is the inaugural symposium of the
newly founded Institute for Law and Rationality at the
University of Minnesota Law School.
The following collection of articles represents the
product of a conference held in April 2007 at the
University of Minnesota, hosted and sponsored by the
Institute for Law and Rationality and co-sponsored by the
Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research. All
views expressed in the symposium articles resulting from
the conference are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Minnesota Journal
of Law, Science & Technology. To view the full video of
the conference and for more information, visit
http://local.law.umn.edu/iflr/april2007conferenceagenda.h
tml.
The Institute for Law and Rationality was founded to
encourage scholarship that “gets it right” about people—
an antidote, as it were, to the admittedly unrealistic
rational person model, as modified by the supposedly
more realistic behavioral law and economics model. I
have argued that behavioral law and economics, in its first
wave, has entrenched many of the more problematic
pathologies of the rational person model.1 Deviations
from the orthodox model are accepted, but characterized
as “irrationalities.” The Institute seeks to depart from this
paradigm, in which there is an orthodox model from which
there are deviations, “irrationalities.” Rather, it seeks to
develop a process-based notion of rationality, in the
tradition of the Nobel prize-winning economist and

1

© 2008 Claire A. Hill.
. Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioural
Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 563 (2004).
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political scientist Herbert Simon.2 To that end, in this
symposium, scholars from law, economics, neuroscience
and psychology consider various ways in which people
arrive at views of themselves and others. Much of the
scholarship in the fields of trust, empathy and the self
emphasizes the non-cognitive, more emotive features; the
symposium papers focus more on the cognitive. That
being said, the non-cognitive and emotive features are
not ignored. They are, however, treated as part of a
descriptive account of how people make decisions and
come to their world-views, not as explanations for
irrationalities and “mistakes.”
The first paper, Negative Dimensions of Identity: A
Research Agenda for Law and Public Policy, by Avner BenNer and Claire A. Hill, argues that some dimensions of
identity can have negative effects. When members of
ethnic or religious groups come into close proximity,
violent conflict may result, especially insofar as a group
member’s identity as a group member comes to crowd
out other dimensions of his or her identity. The article
argues for a research strategy to consider how law might
help minimize these negative effects.
In Identity, Culture and Stories: Empathy and the War
on Terrorism, William D. Casebeer argues that it is critical
to understand how terrorists construct their narratives of
what they are doing. He argues for an important role for
narrative in understanding and explaining the world and
one’s own place in it, and as providing a rationale for
one’s actions. If we understand terrorists’ narratives, we
can potentially use that understanding to construct
counter-narratives.
The Rationality of Preference Construction (and the
Irrationality of Rational Choice), by Claire A. Hill,
acknowledges the consensus outside of economics that
preferences are constructed, and argues that economists
should concede the point, and develop an account of
preferences that takes preference construction into
2

. “[I]n economics, rationality is viewed in terms of the choices it
produces; in the other social sciences, it is viewed in terms of the
processes it employs. The rationality of economics is substantive
rationality, while the rationality of psychology is procedural rationality.”
Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL
CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 25, 26 (Robin M.
Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (citation omitted).
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account. Economists go wrong in thinking of preferences
as being for “traditional objects of choice.” Once
preferences are acknowledged to be importantly about
second-order attributes (such as happiness, status, views
of oneself and so on); that they are necessarily
constructed becomes clear. It is only recently that the
term “carbon footprint” came into currency.
The
preference for being, seeing oneself as, and being seen
as, someone who does not leave much of a carbon
footprint will clearly dictate particular ways of comporting
oneself, ways that will change not only as the concept
evolves but also as the person balances this view of
herself with others she holds (of herself as, for instance,
hard working and punctual and hence spending as little
time commuting as possible).
An inquiry about the
principles of preference construction is hence inevitable.
A companion piece by Hill, The Myth of Discovery,
argues that the idea that preferences are fixed is part of a
greater “myth of discovery” wherein preferences preexist, to be discovered. That preferences are partly
discovered and partly created presents a theoretical
reason that complements the mounting empirical
evidence that more choice is not necessarily better.
Peter H. Huang’s Authentic Happiness, Self
Knowledge & Legal Policy surveys happiness research,
and argues that it ought to have a more prominent place
in policymaking. Happiness as an academic subject is a
relatively recent addition in the social sciences (although
of course, not in fields such as philosophy).
Huang
considers various domains in which policymakers might
advance happiness.
In Heterosexual Sexual Behavior Is Governed by
Social Exchange and Basic Economic Principles: Sexual
Economics Theory, Kathleen D. Vohs and Jannine Lasaleta
explain, and argue for the explanatory power of, Sexual
Economics Theory, a theory akin to one espoused in
evolutionary biology and other related fields, in which
women parcel out sexual favors selectively, with men
spending considerable time and energy to obtain such
favors. They consider and discuss research that shows
this phenomenon in many different contexts, including
advertising; they consider some future directions for
research in the area.
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In Straight Acting, Dale Carpenter argues against the
disparagement implicit in the concept of “straight acting”
gays. The conduct associated with “straight acting” need
not be either “straight” or “acting,” he says. Carpenter
discusses ways in which law promotes the pernicious
straight acting concept and hence the associated
oppositional identity. True liberation would be for people
to feel as though they need not “perform” either a
stereotypically gay identity or a stereotypically straight
identity.
In Empathy and Compassion, Richard Warner argues
that empathy is an important means by which we can
know what someone else thinks, but that frequently we
think we have empathy in a particular case when we do
not. Recognizing that someone else’s felt experience may
be quite different than we imagine may help us be more
tolerant.
In Social Influences on Moment-to-Moment and
Retrospective
Evaluations
of Experiences,
Suresh
Ramanathan and Ann L. McGill argue that when two
people experience certain types of common consumption
activities together, they react more similarly to one
another and enjoy the experience more than would be the
case if they were experiencing the activity separately.
Emanuela Carbonara, Francesco Parisi and Georg von
Wangenheim argue, in Legal Innovation and the
Compliance Paradox, that when the law’s expressive force
is strong, if law is made more severe, violations decrease,
as does resistance to the law. But where the law’s
expressive force is weaker, sudden increases in penalties
may lead to greater resistance and more violations.
In Intentions, Guilt and Social Interactions, J. Atsu
Amegashie considers situations where intentions affect
payoffs. One making an invitation may be motivated by
guilt rather than sincerely wanting the other to accept the
invitation.
In different contexts, people may have
different reactions to insincerity, for instrumental or
intrinsic reasons. Taking insincerity into account shows
that sometimes, mutually beneficial trades do not happen.
Mario J. Rizzo argues, in Justice Versus Benevolence: A
Modern Humean View, that the same action can be
viewed as an application of justice or a denial of
beneficence depending on whether one is construing it at
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a higher or lower level of abstraction. There may be a
tendency to look at lower levels of abstraction thus
introducing a bias into the system. The paper suggests
that mechanisms to counter this bias might be desirable.
In Social and Emotional Influences on Decision Making
and the Brain, Mauricio R. Delgado and James G. Dilmore
consider how learning may be affected by one’s prior
beliefs. More specifically, if a person has prior social
information about another, she may interpret the other’s
behavior differently than she would without such
information. Her prior information that someone is “good”
may make her slow to take in the other’s bad behavior
and interpret it as such. The authors present evidence of
their thesis from scans showing the extent and areas of
brain activation. The paper discusses implications for law;
it cautions particularly to be mindful of a person’s
preconceptions as she’s being considered for possible
inclusion on a jury.
Some of the assertions from the symposium papers
are: The concept of “straight acting” pushes people
towards either acting straight or having an “oppositional”
identity; both are inauthentic. It is too easy for us to think
that we can analogize from our experience to another’s:
empathy can indeed be a good tool for understanding
others, but only when used with appropriate cautions and
caveats. Our prior beliefs about someone may influence
how we take in future information about that person,
making us slow to believe “bad” things about someone we
have thought of as “good.” Our reactions to various
experiences are not dictated by the “fundamental” nature
of the experience itself: aspects of the situation in which
one has the experience, including whether one is alone or
with another person and, if the latter, what the other
person thinks, is relevant. What we think of as our
“identity” may be malleable; identity may properly be
thought of as part discovery part creation.
Our
preferences, too, may properly be thought of as part
discovery part creation.
The symposium papers, taken as a whole, show the
richness of a process based concept of rationality; they
show, too, through theoretical and empirical explorations
and methodologies, the different dimensions of the
human psyche that can be illuminated by an inquiry into
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how people come to their views of the world and
themselves rather than one that takes a narrow view of
rationality as its baseline and identifies deviations. The
symposium encouraged a dialogue that is continuing, and
will continue in the future.

